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ABSTRACT 
Matthew M. Mengert: Minority Representation and Redistricting 
(Under the direction of: Dr. Christopher Clark) 
 
The redrawing of legislative district boundaries is one of most effective ways of elevating the 
level of minority representation in Congress, but it can similarly be the principal way in which 
representation and influence are diluted. In this paper, minority representation is evaluated 
through descriptive representation and substantive representation. Examining the ways in which 
different bodies redistrict and provide for representation, this study assesses a potential tradeoff 
that is produced through the creation of districts that provide for descriptive representation. The 
findings herein suggest that the concentrations of minority populations in districts significantly 
influence the support of pertinent civil rights legislation. Similarly, the method used to draw the 
districts produces differing levels of descriptive and substantive representation. This study 
demonstrates the importance of the close monitoring of redistricting practices, the positive and 
negative impacts of districts with high levels of minority concentration and provides a 
framework upon which the decision in Shelby County v. Holder can be understood as threatening 
to the half century of successes provided for by the Voting Rights Act.  
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Minority Representation and Redistricting 
By: Matt Mengert 
Introduction 
Since the United States was founded, the endeavor to perfect a system of representative 
democracy has been hampered by the inadequate access to equal representation and political 
influence. Even as limitations to voting have been lifted and access to voting accelerated, the 
absence of meaningful political influence continues to leave many feeling unrepresented. For 
African Americans, disenfranchisement and historical injustices barred the access to 
representation until just a few decades ago. Following a short period of political influence during 
the Reconstruction era, Jim Crow swept across the South, again alienating African Americans 
from virtually all elements of social life, particularly stifling their political freedoms and 
opportunities. 
 For the better part of the twentieth century, detachment from political influence, 
especially in the South, was commonplace for non-Whites. Even after Congress passed the 
Voting Rights Act in 1965, securing basic political rights did not come without heavy resistance. 
Determined to maintain their political control, Whites continued to limit the influence of 
minority voters until they could no more.  
 As a result of the historical injustices, and lingering prejudices, African Americans found 
themselves unable to meaningfully influence politics and elections. However, across the South, 
African Americans were slowly able to register to vote – in some cases out-registering White 
constituencies. 1  Nonetheless, their ability to elect representatives of their choosing was 
																																																								
1 J. Morgan Kousser, “When African-Americans Were Republicans in North Carolina, The Target of Suppressive 
Laws Was Black Republicans. Now That They Are Democrats, The Target Is Black Democrats. The Constant 
Is Race” (unpublished report, December 2017), Microsoft Word file.   
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outmatched by white majorities. As the in-migration of Hispanics and other foreign-born citizens 
grew, Congress provided protections against discriminatory practices for language minorities in 
the 1975 amendments to the Voting Rights Act.2  
 In 1982, nearly twenty years after the installment of the Voting Rights Act, Congress 
added another amendment, which mandated states to draw districts to allow minority groups to 
“participate in the political process and elect representatives of their choice.” 3 It would thereafter 
be improper to neglect highly populated minority constituencies, if configured appropriately. The 
law, as it was interpreted, provided a discriminatory effects standard to redistricting practices. 
Following the 1982 amendments, minority parties were given standing on the basis of Section 2 
if they were not provided with districts that would reasonably allow for political influence.  
 Ten years later, in 1992, African Americans were elected to congressional seats in states 
that hadn’t had a non-White representative since Reconstruction. However, as will be discussed, 
the Supreme Court confused much of the initial excitement in a number of early 1990s rulings, 
which effectively limited the ability for states to construct minority districts in the way they had 
in the previous redistricting cycle. In 1993, the Court ruled in Shaw v. Reno that race could not 
be used as the predominant factor in the construction of districting plans, even if it such 
considerations were made to promote higher levels of minority representation. 
 In accordance with the Constitution, every ten years, states must redraw their legislative 
and Congressional boundaries. In the majority of states, the state legislature is vested with the 
primary responsibility of drawing the district maps. However, recent history has displayed the 
harmful effects that gerrymandered and manipulated districts can have on the representation of 																																																																																																																																																																																		
 
2 Michael Jones-Correa, “Language Provisions Under the Voting Rights Act: How Effective Are They?” Social 
Science Quearterly, no. 3 (2005): 549–64, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0038-4941.2005.00317. 
3 Tinsley Yarbrough, Race and Redistricting: The Shaw-Cromartie Cases (Lawarence: University Press of Kansas, 
2002), 2. 
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voters. This paper will examine the ways in which the redistricting process influenced minority 
representation through four redistricting cycles (1982, 1992, 2002, 2012). 
 The redistricting process can be beneficial to the representation of minority voters if 
conducted properly, with well-intentioned motives and accompanied by the necessary framework 
of understanding. These benefits can extend to groups that would not otherwise have the 
opportunity to elect representatives of their choosing or meaningfully participate in the political 
process. By paying particular attention to the representation of the two largest minority groups in 
the country – African Americans and Hispanics – one can better evaluate how redistricting can 
influence electoral returns and how the concentration of minority voters across districts can 
render differing levels of representation.   
 To date, much of the analysis concerning minority representation assesses one or both of 
the following types of representation: descriptive representation and substantive representation. 
Descriptive representation can be understood as representation from elected officials who share a 
trait with a group of citizens, whether it is racially, ethically, religiously or so on.4 Substantive 
representation considers whether a representative’s political activities (voting, advocacy, etc.) are 
reflective of a constituent or group of constituents’ policy preferences.5 
 As there is an underlying debate regarding the attention to racial data in composing 
districts, this paper follows from the position that to render the greatest levels of representation 
for minorities, both descriptive and substantive, the use of racial data in the composition of the 
districts is necessary and should be optimized to the greatest extent possible. With this in mind, it 
has become increasingly apparent that the redistricting bodies vested with the data to do so 
																																																								
4 Hanna F. Pitkin. The Concept of Representation (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), 
250.  
5 Pitkin The Concept of Representation, 84-9. 
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should at all times ensure an absolute safeguard against the intentional use of such data to either 
discriminate against or suppress the political opportunities of minority voters. As will be 
evaluated, increased minority descriptive representation may have an adverse impact on 
substantive representation upon consideration of the relative concentrations of minority voters in 
surrounding districts.  
 
The following two primary questions will be evaluated:  
1. Which methods used to draw Congressional district lines render the greatest level of 
descriptive representation for minorities?  
2. Does the extent to which minority voters are concentrated into districts yield differing 
levels of the substantive representation that those voters receive? 
 
 Following the 1992 cycle of redistricting, in concert with the legal mandates set forth by 
the Supreme Court and Congress, the number of minority representatives elected to Congress 
increased dramatically, with 38 African Americans and 17 Hispanics elected that year.6 In the 
decade that followed, the Court struck down the maps that contained many of the newly created 
minority districts. These judicial decisions complicated understandings regarding the legislative 
authority to provide for minority representation. One can address many of these questions and 
the ways in which scholars have attempted to evaluate the redistricting process and its resultant 
effect on minority representation in Congress. 
																																																								
6 David Lublin, The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 41. 
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 Extensive research has been conducted on the topic of minority representation, but a 
considerable amount of this work was carried out during the 1990s and the early 2000s.7 
Although others have studied the representation of minorities more recently,8 considerations of 
the impacts of racial gerrymandering on minority representation have been increasingly 
examined alongside partisan gerrymandering. However, the important distinction between race 
and party should not be misunderstood – partisan biases have increasingly become proxies for 
racial biases. Such biases are susceptible to evaluative misunderstanding if assessed together, and 
most certainly if such assessments fail to situate predominant focus and consideration unto 
minority interests. 
 Nonetheless, explicit questions regarding the effects of redistricting on minority 
representation continue to necessitate careful consideration and additional evaluation. In this 
study, methodological approaches and matters of previous research are coupled with an 
enhanced spatial approach, the consideration of redistricting methods and a robust congressional 
sample size. The differing ways in which the bodies responsible for drawing districts 
(Legislatures, Judiciary, etc.,) were evaluated on the basis of the subsequent production of both 
minority descriptive and substantive representation. As to evaluate substantive representation, 
districts surrounding those represented by minority officials are examined through the utilization 
of spatially lagged data. This provides for the opportunity to analyze the minority concentration 
																																																								
7 See Charles Cameron et al., “Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in 
Congress?” American Political Science Review 90, no. 5 (1996): 794–812;  David Canon, Race, Redistricting, 
and Representation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 178; David Lublin, The Paradox of 
Representation, 41; Marvin Overby et al., “Unintended Consequences?” The Journal of Politics 58, no. 2 
(1996): 540–50; Carol Swain, Black Faces, Black Interests (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); 
Kenny Whitby, The Color of Representation (Ann Arbor: University of Michagan Press, 1995); Kenny 
Whitby and George Krause, “Race, Issue Heterogeneity and Public Policy” British Journal of Political 
Science 31, no. 3 (2001): 555–72; Kenneth Shotts, “Does Racial Redistricting Cause Conservative Policy 
Outcomes?” Journal of Politics 65, no. 1 (2003): 216–26.  
8 Christian Grose, Congress in Black and White: Race and Representation in Washington and at Home (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
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in a given district as the explanatory variable for the support of civil rights legislation in 
surrounding districts.  
 The literature review will consider three primary elements. First, it will explore the 
pertinent legal matters, considering the ways in which scholars have analyzed these matters and 
their influences on minority representation. The next section considers the literature devoted to 
understanding the various methods of redistricting, with an assessment of the different ways in 
which districts tend to be constructed and the potential tradeoffs between partisan gains and 
minority districts. Finally, the different methods that scholars in this realm have utilized are 
analyzed to evaluate the representational effects of differing levels of minority concentrations in 
districts.  
 
Legal Primer: The VRA and Supreme Court Cases  
 Much of the motivation that can be seen in redistricting plans can be traced back to the 
Voting Rights Act, its later amendments and a number of significant Supreme Court decisions 
from the latter half of the twentieth century.9 This section will evaluate those pieces of legislation 
and Court rulings, detailing the ways in which the state legislatures were directed to construct 
district maps with the intent of increasing minority representation. As later rulings were through 
to be inconsistent with earlier precedent, one must also consider the ways in which these 
fluctuations ultimately influenced state practice. Together, these Court rulings and pieces of 
legislation illustrate the unsettled nature of the mandates set forth unto state legislatures. The 
juxtaposition between federal oversight and what is ultimately a State practice will become 
clearer as this section and the paper progress.  																																																								
9 Robert Brischetto, “Latino Voters and Redistricting in the New Millennium.” In Redistricting and Minority 
Representation: Learning from the Past, Preparing for the Future, ed. David A. Bositis (Lanham: University 
Press of America, 1998), 43–104. 
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 Early Supreme Court rulings in Baker v. Carr (1962), Wesberry v. Sanders (1964) and 
Reynolds v. Sims (1964) were instrumental in defending the “one person, one vote” standard and 
mandating that population deviations be minimized.10 These rulings set a legal precedent for later 
cases pertinent to minority representation, in that the Court found cases regarding redistricting to 
be justiciable.  
Just days after thousands of people marched from Selma to Montgomery in support of 
voting rights and equal political opportunity, President Lyndon Johnson signed the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 into law. The Voting Rights Act intended, firstly, to rid the electoral system of the 
discriminatory barriers that had hindered African Americans and other minorities from 
registering to vote and casting ballots.11 These initial efforts were extraordinary as minority 
voters, particularly Southern African Americans, registered to vote in sizable numbers. 
Subsequent amendments to the Voting Rights Act focused on protecting minority groups and 
their opportunities for political influence – redistricting had previously been a route through 
which this influence had been diluted, but was also thought to be an instrument through which 
influence could be accumulated.12 Sections 2, 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act had a remarkably 
profound influence on the redistricting processes that followed.  
Section 2 applies to every state and predominantly operates as a protection of minority 
voting rights. Vote dilution is considered one of the primary ways in which those rights are 
typically violated. The Supreme Court ruling in Thornburg v. Gingles (1986) helped to clarify 
the circumstances under which minority vote dilution could be detected and rectified.13 
																																																								
10 Canon, Race, Redistricting, and Representation, 62. 
11 Morgan Kousser, Colorblind Injustice (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Bernard 
Grofman et al., Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality (New York: Cambridge University, 
1992). 
12 Grofman et al., 133-35. 
13 For further information regarding claims against Section 2, see Yarbrough, Race and Redistricting, 7-8, 159-162. 
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 For a number of decades, Section 5 required states and counties with histories of voter 
discrimination – such as racial redistricting, literacy tests, poll taxes and white primaries – to 
receive preclearance from the Department of Justice for any changes to electoral procedures.14 
Jurisdictions subject to Section 5 were determined by the formula in Section 4(b), which located 
places that had exposed individuals to discriminatory practices.15 Compliance with Section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act was found to increase minority representation and electoral opportunities 
for minority groups.16 In renewing the Voting Rights Act in 1975, Congress included protections 
for language minorities, which provided needed securities for Hispanics and other language 
minorities.17 
 In United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh v. Carey (1977), the Court faced a 
constitutional challenge to a districting plan that split a Hasidic Jewish community in New York 
into a number of districts with Puerto Rican and African American majorities.18 The Court ruled 
that the Voting Rights Act could be used as an instrument to increase the political opportunities 
of minority voters, and not merely as a remedial tool as it had been utilized for its first decade of 
existence.19 This Court ruling singled a change in direction – the redistricting cases and 
																																																								
14 Kousser, Colorblind Injustice, 375; For detailed description of the Courts decisions regarding the 
unconstitutionality of Section 4 see Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013) (the Supreme Court struck 
down the Section 4 formula, and thus cleared the list of 12 states and jurisdictions that were previously 
required to have changes to voting procedures approved. As such, Section 5 rests void until Congress 
determines a new formula for identifying the jurisdictions subject to the preclearance requirement). 
15 Kousser, 70. 
16 Jason Barabas and Jennifer Jerit, “Redistricting Principles and Racial Representation.” State Politics & Policy 
Quarterly 4, no. 4 (2004); Nicholas Seabrook, Drawing the Lines: Constraints of Partisan Gerrymandering in 
U.S. Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017): 100; Thomas Mann, Redistricting Reform: What Is 
Desirable? Possible?” In Party Lines: Competition, Partisanship, and Congressional Redistricting 
(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2005): 107-8. See Ibid., Chapter 1. 
17 Stephen Malone, Beneficial Gerrymanders: The Impact of Majority-Black Districts on African-American 
Representation in the United States House of Representatives (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1994). 
18 See United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S 144 (1977); For greater analysis on UJO see Kousser, 
Colorblind Injustice, 374, Chapters 1 and 7.   
19 Kousser, Colorblind Injustice, 375; Kenny Whitby, The Color of Representation: Congressional Behavior and 
Black Interests (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997): 115; Canon, Race, Redistricting, and 
Representation, 78; Yarbrough, Race and Redistricting, 58. 
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legislation that followed demonstrated the necessity for the redistricting process to facilitate the 
enhancement of the political and electoral influence of minority voters.  
 In 1982, new amendments to Voting Rights Act outlined the requirement for district 
plans to enhance involvement in the political process and the ability for minority voters to elect 
representatives of their choosing.20 The amendments found districts to be in violation not simply 
when they could be proved to have a “discriminatory intent,” in addition it outlawed districting 
plans that showed dilution through “discriminatory results.”21 As such, the Court struck down a 
precedent established in City of Mobile v. Bolden,22 which required plaintiffs to only prove the 
discriminatory intent of a districting plan. Introducing the discriminatory results standards is an 
example of a way in which the Court acted to foster political opportunities for minorities. 
Congress provided language in Section 2 of in the 1982 amendments that provided minority 
groups with protections against districting plans that resulted in the denial or abridgement of 
voting rights.23 
 Four years after the 1982 amendments, in Thornburg v. Gingles (1986), the Supreme 
Court set forth three preconditions that would have to be proven to establish a violation of 
Section 2. The conditions that the Court established in Thornburg v. Gingles (1986) were 
evaluative of the minority group’s size, residential compactness, voting cohesion and whether or 
not a minority group was consistently unable to defeat white candidates.24  The Court focused on 
multimember districts, basing its criticism on the discriminatory effects. In the decision, the 																																																								
20 Canon, Race, Redistricting, and Representation, 66. For further information regarding the 1982 amendments, See 
1982 U.S Senate Report 31, 28-29, 97-417 for the language of the “Senate factors” developed in 1982 
amendment;  
21 Yarbrough, Race and Redistricting, 74 
22City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).  
23 S. 1992, 97th Cong. § 2 (1982), The bill included the following language regarding claims against Section 2: “No 
voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by 
any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any 
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” 
24 Yarbrough, Race and Redistricting, 61, 149-50. 
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Court recognized and upheld the 1982 amendment, which suggested provided for evaluation of 
“discriminatory results,” rather than simply “discriminatory intent.” 25 
 Following the 1990 census, state legislatures across the country attempted to adhere to 
the mandates set forth by the 1982 amendments and Gingles. In the 1992 cycle of redistricting, 
state legislatures created an unprecedented number of majority-minority districts.26 Consistent 
with the intent of the plans, these majority-minority districts allowed for districts compatible 
with the electability of minority representatives.27 In many states, non-White representatives 
were elected for the first time since the beginning of the twentieth century.28 For nearly twenty 
years, the Supreme Court demonstrated consistent favor towards districting plans that intended to 
increase minority representation. The Court had interpreted the Voting Rights Act and the Equal 
Protection Clause in a manner that accelerated the political power of minority voters.  
 However, in Shaw v. Reno (1993), the Supreme Court struck down two newly created 
majority-minority districts in North Carolina, suggesting that they constituted an impermissible 
racial gerrymander. 29  Departing from precedent, 30  the Supreme Court determined that the 
majority-minority districts were justiciable on the basis of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court cited the bizarre shapes of the districts, the violation of the 
rights of white voters and disregard of traditional districting principles.31 In Shaw the Court 
interpreted the Equal Protection Clause in a way that stymied districting practices that were 																																																								
25 See Ibid., 8 (Discussion of the objection to multi-member districts and the adherance to previous 1982 
legislation). 
26 William Miller and Jeremy Walling, “Tom and ‘Gerry’?” In The Political Battle Over Congressional 
Representation (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013), 14. See Kousser, Colorblind Injustice, 377; Note: In UJO, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist had seemingly granted approval of race-conscious districting, which stimulated these 
efforts and aided in the reluctance to file racial gerrymandering claims against such plans. 
27 See Canon, Race, Redistricting, and Representation, 146-50; Lublin, The Paradox of Representation, 37-8. 
28 Kousser, Colorblind Injustice, 273-4. 
29 Lublin, The Paradox of Representation, 39-40. 
30 See footnote 24 (Precedent set forth by Chief Justice in UJO opinion).  
31 Yarbrough, Race and Redistricting, 70-9; see quotations from O’Connor opinion in Shaw v. Reno 509 U.S. 630 
(1993). (Traditional districting criteria are suggested to be “compactness, contiguity, and respect for political 
subdivisions”). 
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attempting to allocate a greater influence to minority voters – the same group for which the 
Clause was created.  
In the majority opinion to Shaw, Justice O’Connor suggested that non-compact minority 
districts would reinforce stereotypes that minority voters share political interests and that they 
tend to prefer the same candidates when voting.32 Justice O’Connor maintained that drawing such 
districts “may exacerbate … patterns of racial bloc voting,” and would make elected officials 
“more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that 
group.”33 In an impassioned dissent, Justice White wrote of the importance of minority districts 
in ensuring the electability of minority representatives, and suggested that many of the 
speculations within the majority opinion were misguided and inaccurate.34 Much evidence 
suggested that, in fact, African Americans were politically cohesive and that their unique 
political attitudes differed from those of White voters.35 
The precedent of Shaw extended to cases that proceeded after its ruling, in that 
redistricting plans were no longer permitted to use race as the predominant factor in constructing 
new district lines.36 Future claims against minority districts thereafter only needed to prove that 
voters were separated into “different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks 
																																																								
32 For full O’Connor opinion, see Shaw v. Reno 509 U.S. 630 (1993), 2827. 
33 Ibid., at line 2877; For explanation of the opinion, see Kousser, Colorblind Injustice, 387. 
34 Kousser, Colorblind Injustice, 387. (In the dissent, Justice White explained that a realistic approach to the 
situation helps to explain why the districts were needed and created. They were necessary for the purposes of 
allowing minority voters to influence elections and policy alike. As evidenced by the 1992 elections, they were 
effective. The creation of the districts proved, to that point, to be the most effective effort to afford minority 
representation in Congress).   
35 Paula McClain and Joseph Stewart, “Can We All Get Along?” Racial and Ethnic Minorities in American Politics. 
6th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2013), 78-102; Kousser, Colorblind Injustice, 387; Grose, Congress in 
Black and White, 29-31. 
36 See Jonathan Winburn, The Realities of Redistricting: Following the Rules and Limiting Gerrymandering In State 
Legislative Redistricting (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008), 25; Canon, Race, Redistricting, and 
Representation; Kousser, Colorblind Injustice. 
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sufficient justification.” 37  Such a ruling and the classification of “traditional districting 
principles” were inconsistently applied in racial gerrymandering cases that followed.38 
With the 1993 decision in Shaw, the Court sent a message to states around the country. If 
state legislatures were to draw districts that provided minority voters the reasonable opportunity 
to elect candidates of their choosing, the construction of those districts would have to be made on 
the basis of something other than race. If race were to be used as the predominant factor, states 
would have to prove that such was done to fulfill a “compelling governmental interest.”39 
 Nonetheless, Shaw made the task of redistricting with the purpose of affording minorities 
higher levels of representation a much more difficult endeavor. The ways in which districts were 
constructed to provide for minority representation would thereafter depend upon the objectives 
and guidelines that the various bodies responsible for drawing the districts conformed to, which 
provides fitting reasons to analyze the structural and procedural elements of the redistricting 
process. 
 
Methods of Redistricting 
 Although not universally true, the party in control of a state’s legislature typically dictates 
the responsibility of drawing district lines. States legislatures adhere to distinct redistricting 
criteria and tend to redistrict with different objectives. Questions remain as to which methods 
produce the greatest representational outcomes for minority voters, both descriptive and 
																																																								
37 For further reading of the written opinion, see Shaw v. Reno 509 U.S. 630 (1993), at 647, 649. 
38 With notable inconsistency, the Court ruled in Voinovich v. Quilter (1993) that packing minority voters into 
districts was permissible under Section 2, as it can seek to limit dilution of minority influence (Dudley 2016, 
92). In Miller v. Johnson (1995), the Court ruled that race could not be used as the predominant factor in the 
creation on district plans, striking down a number of Black-majority districts (Canon, 80). In Bush v. Vera 
(1996), the Court ruled that race predominated incumbency protection, striking down a Texas redistricting plan 
that sought to protect incumbents at the cost of Black voter’s ability to elect representatives of their choice 
(Canon 81; Kousser). 
39 See Kousser, Colorblind Injustice, Chapter 8. 
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substantive. Much of this research considers various types of gerrymanders, symmetrical returns 
and the competitive nature of elections that are characteristic of the various methods.40 While this 
paper will not consider the political outcomes in the same manner, it does utilize similar 
measures that scholars have devised, but only insofar as to evaluate minority representation.  
 When states conduct the redistricting process, party interests tend to outshine all others. 
While the term gerrymandering typically carries a negative connotation as “bad practice,” it is 
often incumbent in the pursuit of effectively providing for substantial minority representation.41  
Deciphering the differences between the various methods of redistricting and their objectives 
helps to illustrate which districting methods yield the highest levels of representation and 
influence for minority constituencies. 
 
Methods: Structures and Outcomes 
 In evaluating the control of the redistricting process, I refer to the mechanism through 
which a state’s districts were drawn as the “method” used to draw the districts. Scholars typically 
assign this method a label of Partisan, Bipartisan, Judicial or Independent.42 While the bipartisan 
method of redistricting receives its own label, it is comparable to the partisan method because 
state legislative officials, of some capacity, are responsible for the construction of the districts in 
both methods. Bipartisan control of the districting process is different than the Partisan method 
																																																								
40 Nicholas Stephanopoulos, “Race, Place, and Power,” Stanford Law Review 68, no. 6 (2016): 1323–1408, 
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2016/06/4_-_Stephanopoulos_-
_Stan._L._Rev.pdf; Nicholas Stephanopoulos and Eric M McGhee, “Partisan Gerrymandering and the 
Efficiency Gap,” The University of Chicago Law Review 82, no. 2 (2015): 831–900; Gregory Warrington, 
“Quantifying Gerrymandering Using the Vote Distribution,” Burlington: Department of Mathematics & 
Statistics, University of Vermont (2017); Seabrook, Drawing the Lines, 76-8, 85-90. 
41 Barabas and Jerit, Redistricting Principles and Racial Representation.  
42 See Nicholas Goedert, “Redistricting, Risk, and Representation: How Five State Gerrymanders Weathered the 
Tides of the 2000s.” Election Law Journal 13, no. 3 (2014): 406–18; Justin Levitt and Erika Wood,  A 
Citizen’s Guide to Redistricting. New York: Brennan Center for Justice, 2008; Seabrook, Drawing the Lines, 
65-7. 
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in that more explicit, neutral redistricting standards emerge from the Bipartisan method, as 
criteria must generally be agreed upon for the purposes of legislative approval – typically parties 
approach the agreements in an effort maintain the seats already held by each party.43 This 
typically leads to lower levels of responsiveness and competition, as safe seats are sought after in 
as many districts as possible.44   
 Although state legislatures have been, and still are, chiefly responsible for the 
construction of district boundaries, some state constitutions include provisions allowing for 
redistricting commissions to preside over the process if legislative plans are not passed by 
particular statutory deadlines.45 Other states have adopted legislation or passed a constitutional 
referendum bestowing the responsibility of drawing legislative maps to a commission, thus 
effectively removing the authority and obligation from the state legislature.46 In many cases, 
legal challenges to the constitutionality of district maps produced by partisan and bipartisan 
bodies or failures to meet statutory deadlines have resulted in judicial entities inheriting the 
responsibility for composing the districts.47  
 Considerable research has evaluated the common redistricting practices of partisan 
legislatures – these evaluations are more common than those related to commissions or judicial-
drawn districts. Due to the fact that the control of the redistricting process often changes 
following each census, research has been devoted to identifying the effects of these state-level 
																																																								
43 Seabrook, Drawing the Lines, 99. 
44 Ibid., 100.  
45 See J. Carson et al., “Reevaluating the Effects of Redistricting on Electoral Competition, 1972-2012,” State 
Politics & Policy Quarterly 14 (2014): 165–77; Levitt, A Citizen’s Guide; Seabrook, Drawing the Lines, 66. 
46 Levitt, A Citizen’s Guide. 
47 Richard Engstrom, “The Political Thicket, Electoral Reform, and Minority Voting Rights,” In Fair and Effective 
Representation edited by Wilson Carey McWilliams (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 3–67. 
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transformations.48 Similarly, the strategies employed by partisan legislatures are often geared 
towards the short-term electability of the greatest number of party candidates and also the long-
term security of control of the districting process. 49  Partisan bodies are most commonly 
responsible for coupling the gerrymandering strategies of “cracking” and “packing.” Cracking 
can be understood as the splitting of the opposing party’s constituency base into dispersed 
concentrations of minimal influence, whereas packing is the practice of concentrating opposing 
party constituents into highly favorable districts for the opposing party. Implementing partisan 
gerrymanders that interfere with majority-minority districts have either failed to receive 
preclearance from the DOJ or have been challenged in federal court.50   
 When a single party controls the redistricting process, they tend to leverage partisan 
majorities to manufacture advantages for candidates of their own party.51 Scholars maintain that 
protecting incumbents and party interests places significant limitations on minority 
representation.52 These claims are made on the basis that partisan influences tend to motivate 
districting plans as to elect the greatest number of delegates from one party and to obstruct the 
electoral opportunities of the other. 53  However, similar research has suggested that bipartisan 
districting plans may be more harmful to representation than plans devised by a single party.54 
This is likely because bipartisan compromises strive to safeguard the incumbents of both parties, 																																																								
48 Bruce Cain et al., “From Equality to Fairness: The Path of Political Reform since Baker v. Carr,” In Party Lines: 
Competition, Partisanship, and Congressional Redistricting edited by Thomas E. Mann and Bruce E. Cain 
(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2005), 20–23; Seabrook, Drawing the Lines, 68-111.  
49 Seabrook, Drawing the Lines, 102.  
50 Mark Monmonier, Bushmanders and Bullwinkles: How politicians manipulate electronic maps and census data to 
win elections (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Seabrook, Drawing the Lines, 25. 
51 See A. Yoshinaka, and C. Murphy, “The Paradox of Redistricting: How Partisan Mapmakers Foster Competition 
but Disrupt Representation.,” Political Research Quarterly 64, no. 2 (2010), 435–47. 
doi:10.1177/1065912909355716; Seabrook, Drawing the Lines, 80-9; Goedert, “Redistricting, Risk, and 
Representation”; Levitt, A Citizen’s Guide.  
52 Mann, Party Lines, 19-20.  
53 Shotts, “Does Racial Redistricting Cause Conservative Policy Outcomes,” 216–26. 
54 Anthony McGann et al., Gerrymandering in America: The House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, and the 
Future of Popular Sovereignty (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 18, 158-60; Goedert, 
“Redistricting, Risk, and Representation”; Mann, Party Lines, 19-20. 
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instead of just the representatives from a single party. Due to the relationship between party and 
race, it is likely that partisan biases in the redistricting process render unique consequences for 
minority representative relative to the partisan method used to draw the districts.  
 Maps drawn by commissions and judiciary entities are believed to produce higher levels 
of electoral competition than those drawn by state legislatures.55 Others, however, suggest that 
the method used to draw districts has only a marginal effect on the competition of elections,56 
and an even smaller effect on subsequent polarization.57 Notably, limited empirical research has 
been conducted on districts drawn by commissions due to their relative youth in the redistricting 
landscape. The increased utilization of commissions in the redistricting process is sparking 
interest and encouraging further exploration.58  
 While many scholars have closely analyzed the effects of these different methods on rates 
of incumbency, competition, polarization and other areas of interest, it is necessary to consider 
the ways in which different methods influence minority electoral returns. As such, this 
evaluation endeavors to address the extent to which the method used to draw district lines 
influences rates of minority representation, both descriptive and substantive. Borrowing from 
elements of previous research to date, this study incorporates a dense sample of congressional 
redistricting, which covers a period of time crammed with significant milestones that influenced 
changes in minority representation and the redistricting process more generally.  
 
 
 																																																								
55 Carson et al., “Reevaluating the Effects of Redistricting on Electoral Competition”. 
56 Ibid.; Canon, Race, Redistricting, and Representation; Swain, Black Faces; McClain, “Can We All Get Along”; 
Grose, Congress in Black and White. 
57 Seabrook, Drawing the Lines. 
58 Ibid., Chapter 4. 
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Evaluating Minority Representation: Optimal Gains or Inherent Tradeoffs?   
  No group of voters supports candidates from the Democratic Party more consistently 
than African Americans and Hispanics. 59  As such, when voters from these groups are 
concentrated at high rates – into singular districts – the surrounding districts tend to become 
overwhelmingly White, and thus Republican.60  Scholars suggest that while majority-minority 
districts have advanced minority representation in select districts, surrounding districts have 
become increasingly skewed in favor of Republican candidates.61 As Democrats tend to more 
consistently favor and support the legislative interests of minority groups than Republicans, the 
bleaching62 of surrounding districts likely effects the substantive representation of minority 
voters.63 Although illustrative of the potential effects on representation in surrounding districts, 
previous research has only narrowly evaluated the relationship between the thresholds used to 
create minority districts and the substantive representation received from legislators in the 
surrounding districts. 
 In 1992, as a result of the legal mandates set forth throughout the previous decade, state 
legislatures across the country – especially Democratic legislatures in the South – purposefully 
created majority-minority districts in an effort to elect an increased number of minority 
representatives.64 External pressure, some suggest, 65 came from the Justice Department’s Civil 
Rights Division, which believed that the construction of the districts was required as a result of 																																																								
59 Stephanopoulos and McGee, “Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap,” 92.  
60 Ebonya Washington, “Do Majority-Black Districts Limit Blacks’ Representation? The Case of the 1990 
Redistricting,” The Journal of Law and Economics 55, no. 2 (2012): 251–74; Lublin, The Paradox of 
Representation; Grofman et al.,  Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality. 
61 See Stephanopoulos and McGee, “Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap,” 11; Yarbrough, Race and 
Redistricting, 10; Kousser, Colorblind Injustice, 378; Swain, Black Faces; Shotts, “Does Racial Redistricting 
Cause Conservative Policy Outcomes,” 216–26. 
62 Bleaching refers to the whitening of surrounding districts. Hence, when districts are concentrated excessively with 
minority constituents, it is often referred to as “bleaching”. 
63 Overby et al., “Unintended Consequences,” 540–50; Kousser, Colorblind Injustice. 
64 Seabrook, Drawing the Lines, 22-5; Lublin, The Paradox of Representation, Chapter 4; (Twenty-five new 
majority Latino and Black districts were created between 1990 and 1992). 
65 Yarbrough, Race and Redistricting, 9. 
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the 1982 amendments to the VRA and the Gingles decision. Others believe that such pressure 
was part of an effort from the Bush Administration to maximize Black influence in few districts, 
creating highly populated White districts favorable to Republican candidates in the surrounding 
districts.66  
  Irrespective of the exact reason, during the 1992 redistricting cycle, Democratic 
legislatures, predominantly in control of the Southern states with high minority populations, 
created more majority-minority districts than originally intended.67 The new districts had an 
immediate effect on the successes of minority candidates – the number of Blacks in Congress 
increased by the 13 in 1992, the single largest increase to date.68 Similarly, the Congressional 
Hispanic Caucus grew by nearly 40 percent as a result of the newly created districts.69 These new 
additions were encouraging to minority communities and to civil rights advocates, as the 
increases in descriptive representation provided Blacks and Hispanics with opportunities to 
influence policy more so than ever.70  It is important to note that the number of Judicial drawn 
districts increased significantly during the 1992 cycle because of the lack of adherence on the 
part of many states to properly construct minority districts.  Republicans drew hardly any during 
the years I’ve observed until the 108th Congress.  
 However, in 1994, for the first time in 40 years, the Republican Party took control of 
Congress. Opinions vary regarding the influence of the newly created minority districts upon the 
relatively high number of Democratic incumbents who lost re-election and were replaced by 
Republican representatives.71 Those who credit the swing of the House directly to the increased 																																																								
66 Ibid., 10; Kousser, Colorblind Injustice, 378-90.  
67 Engstrom, “The Political Thicket," 3-7.  
68 Ibid., 10-1. 
69 Lublin, The Paradox of Representation, Chapter 4.  
70 Grofman et al.,  Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality. 
71 Kevin Hill, “Does the Creation of Majority Black Districts Aid Republicans? An Analysis of the 1992 
Congressional Elections in Eight Southern States,” Journal of Politics 57, no. 2 (1995): 384–401; Swain, Black 
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number of majority-minority districts created in the 1992 cycle of redistricting suggest that the 
bleaching of surrounding districts diminished the ability of liberal, minority voters to influence 
the districts.72  On the contrary, others attribute the tide of Republican support across the country, 
more so than the compositions of the new minority districts, to the tilting of control within the 
House.73  
 Extensive research was conducted following the mid-1990s shift in the control of 
Congress. Overwhelmingly, scholars agreed that the newly created majority-minority districts 
had some influence, even if only marginal. For example, Grofman and Handley posits that the 
new minority districts contributed to just ten of the total 63 seats that the Democrats lost between 
1990 and 1994.74 Bob Benenson argues that the Democrats lost three seats because of the racial 
gerrymandering,75 Carol Swain suggests five,76 David Lublin concludes between six to eleven,77 
and Kevin Hill believes that just four seats were lost.78 Together, these evaluations demonstrated 
the academic pursuit to address the effect of majority-minority districts and the subsequent 
increase in minority representation. These studies, while similar in their objectives, consider 
substantive representation in a much different manner.  																																																																																																																																																																																		
Faces, 78-80; Lublin, The Paradox of Representation, 112.  
72 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. “Report of the NAACP Legal Defense and 
Education Fund: The Effect of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act on the 1994 Congressional Elections.” 
Mimeograph, 1994; Swain, Black Faces, 78-83; Lublin, The Paradox of Representation, 111-14; Washington, 
“Do Majority-Black Districts Limit Blacks’ Representation.” 
73 John Petrocik and Scott W. Desposato, “The Partisan Consequences of Majority-Minority Redistricting in the 
South, 1992 and 1994,” The Journal of Politics 60, no. 3 (1998), 613–33; Grofman et al.,  Minority 
Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality; Engstrom, “The Political Thicket.” 
74 Lisa Handley et al., “Electing Minority-Preferred  Candidates to Legislative Office: The Relationship between 
Minority Percentages in Districts and the Election of Minority-Preferred Candidates.” In Race and 
Redistricting in the 1990s; (Demonstration that replacing two white southern Democrats with one black 
Democrat and one white Republican, the average ADA score changes only in a 1-point increase. Black mean 
ADA score is 85, white Dem is 46 and Republican is 6. Therefore two white Dems equals 92, whereas one 
black and one Republican equals 93). 
75 Bob Benenson, “GOP’s Dreams of a Comeback via the New Map Dissolve.” Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
Report 50 (1992), 3580–81. 
76 Swain, Black Faces, 78-80. 
77 Lublin, The Paradox of Representation, 112. 
78  Hill, “Does the Creation of Majority Black Districts Aid Republicans”. 
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Party Motivations  
 The method used to redistrict likely has a significant effect on the ways in which 
majority-minority districts are incorporated into a state’s districting plan.79 Democratic controlled 
redistricting processes tend to draw minority districts while simultaneously trying to maintain a 
Democratic advantage in the surrounding districts.80 Creating majority-minority districts does not 
change the strategy of redistricting plans drawn by Democratic legislatures, but does alter the 
strategy of Republican drawn maps.81 This may be because it is easier to persuade White 
Democrats to vote for Republican candidates than it is to convince Black Democrats to vote for 
the same candidates.82 Plans conceived by Republican legislatures tend to advantage Republican 
contenders, especially in districts that surrounded majority-minority districts.  
 Bleaching can be seen throughout Southern states when creating majority-minority 
districts, even when Democrats create the districts.83 As the White concentration increases and 
Black voters are concentrated into singular districts, minority substantive representation may be 
put in jeopardy.84  
 As mentioned, the Republican control of state legislatures with high internal minority 
populations, in Southern states for example, has only come about recently. It is important to 
effectively evaluate the relationship between the method of redistricting and resultant minority 
representation. Due to the fact that Republicans may be less interested in creating districts 																																																								
79  Kenneth Shotts et al., “Gerrymandering, Legislative Composition, and National Policy Outcomes,” American 
Journal of Political Science 46, no. 2 (2002): 398–414; Seabrook, Drawing the Lines.  
80 Engstrom, “The Political Thicket.” 
81 Shotts et al., “Gerrymandering, Legislative Composition, and National Policy Outcomes”; Shotts, “Does Racial 
Redistricting Cause Conservative Policy Outcomes”.  
82 McClain et al., “Can We All Get Along,” 82-93.  
83 Stephen Malone, Beneficial Gerrymanders : The Impact of Majority-Black Districts on African-American 
Representation in the United States House of Representatives (Inverness: Northwestern University, 1994), 58. 
84 Malone, Beneficial Gerrymanders, 58; (The number of districts with less than 10% black population increased by 
19 after 1992 redistricting; the Democrats generally control districts when blacks constitute 30-50% of 
constituency, but they were pulled from districts of that kind to make majority-minority districts. Democrats 
lost seats from this). 
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compatible with minority electability or minority influence, careful consideration is necessary. 
Scholars often disagree regarding the levels of minority concentration within districts and how 
effective certain levels are at securing descriptive and substantive representation. There are 
multiple theories as to which percentage, or concentration, of minorities leads to the highest 
levels of representation.  
 
Thresholds of Concentration 
 The extent to which minority voters are packed into districts is significant in assessing 
substantive representation, which should be understood not merely through the creation of 
minority districts, but upon evaluating the resulting effects in districts adjacent to minority 
districts. The debate continues as to what thresholds of concentration are necessary for the 
electability of minority candidates, and furthermore at what levels of concentration minority 
influence begins to become excessively diluted in surrounding districts.85 Significant enough 
concentrations often translate into legislative support of policies of interest, but this cannot be 
said for all levels of concentration, nor can it be understood uniformly throughout all regions of 
the country. 86  
 Scholars disagree on the thresholds of concentration necessary to elect minority 
representatives, some suggest that minority voters must constitute 55 percent of a district’s 
population, while others suggest 65 percent.87 Lublin suggests that minority populations of over 
40 percent suffice in providing significant influence to minority voters in some parts of the 
																																																								
85 Engstrom, “The Political Thicket.”; Swain, Black Faces; Lublin; The Paradox of Representation; Grofman et al.,  
Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality. 
86 William Miller and Jeremy Walling, “Tom and ‘Gerry’”; Swain, Black Faces; Lublin; The Paradox of 
Representation.  
87 Swain, Black Faces; Lublin; The Paradox of Representation. 
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country, but not necessarily electability.88 While minority concentrations around the 40 percent 
threshold provide for influence in districts,89 many argue that minority voters must constitute a 
majority to successfully allow for the representation of minority groups in Congress.90 According 
to data prior to the 1992 redistricting cycle almost all minority representatives elected to 
Congress, both African Americans and Hispanics, were elected from districts in which “minority 
group members constituted a majority of the district.” 91  
 There are regional differences regarding the concentrations necessary to elect minority 
representatives as well.92 While Lublin93 provides convincing and significant data concerning the 
electability of minority representatives at various thresholds, other scholars address the electoral 
implications of districts with lower thresholds of minority concentration.94 A study on the 1994 
elections concluded that Democrats in the South lost seats in districts with Black populations 
between 20 and 30 percent at higher rates than districts with Black populations between 10-20 
percent.95 In non-Southern states, however, black populations between 10-20 percent were shown 
to significantly increase Democratic electoral chances, relative to districts in Southern states.96   
 This research suggests the difficult nature of projecting electoral returns upon previous 
results and district demographics. It also illustrates the losses of Black influence as a result 
Republicans gaining office in districts with Black populations between 20-30 percent. Many 
agree that Blacks need to be concentrated into districts at higher thresholds in the South than in 																																																								
88 Lublin; The Paradox of Representation; Grofman et al.,  Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting 
Equality. 
89 Ibid.  
90 Ibid., Ibid., Malone, Beneficial Gerrymanders. 
91 See Mark Rush, Does Redistricting Make a Difference (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 
10; Lublin; The Paradox of Representation, 41 (Non-blacks won 5007 of the 5079 elections held in white 
majority districts between 1972-1994, Blacks won 200 of the 209 races in which blacks constituted a majority 
in the district). 
92 Grofman et al.,  Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality; Grose, Congress in Black and White. 
93 Lublin; The Paradox of Representation, Chapters 2 and 3. 
94 Grofman et al.,  Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality. 
95 Ibid., 58.  
96 Ibid., 59.  
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the non-South to optimally allocate Black concentrations across districts. 97  Now, with 
Republicans in control of the districting processes in most states throughout the South, the 
optimal levels of minority concentration are of great importance. So too is the extent to which 
minority voters are concentrated in surrounding districts, as this likely effects substantive 
representation.  
 As will be illustrated, there are significant differences in the ways in which the different 
methods concentrate minority constituencies. As a consequence of those differing thresholds of 
concentration, minority voters are effectively left with different levels of influence in 
surrounding districts. Due to these differing concentrations, and the effect they have on minority 
electability and influence, potential tradeoffs between both minority descriptive and substantive 
representation exists, and will be explored to show how concentration levels affect the levels of 
representation.  
 
Tradeoffs: Descriptive and Substantive Representation 
 If the advancement of minority interests in Congress were to be measured simply by the 
number of minority representatives elected, then one could be assured that majority-minority 
districts achieve their necessary ends. However, the question persists as to the linkage between 
increased descriptive representation and substantive representation for minorities. 98  While 
descriptive representation has, for quite some time, been the focal point of minority 
representation and redistricting, it may not necessarily the most effective way for minority voters 
to have their policies of interest supported. Thus, it is important to assess the ways in which 																																																								
97 Ibid., 62; Lublin, The Paradox of Representation; Kousser, Colorblind Injustice; Whitby, The Color of 
Representation.  
98 Ibid., Washington, “Do Majority-Black Districts Limit Blacks’ Representation”; Cameron et al., “Do Majority-
Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?” 
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minority districts are created and why such districts are created in order to address such a 
difficulty.   
 Efforts to evaluate the conditions under which descriptive representation is achievable 
typically assess the concentrations of minority voters necessary to provide for the electability of 
minority representatives. On the other hand, substantive representation is typically analyzed 
through the evaluation of ideological and policy leanings of district representatives, statewide 
ideologies, and sometimes the leanings of the Congress as a whole.  
 Scholars have attempted to determine which factors best predict support and advocacy of 
minority interests, but the utilization of different levels of analysis, varying sample sizes, and 
different outcome variables have limited the effectiveness and comparability of these studies. 
While this study utilizes LCCR scores in a consideration of substantive representation, the 
measures used by previous studies to evaluate similar questions provide valuable insights into 
the universe of the approaches and assist in understanding the methodological considerations that 
others have made. 
 Substantive representation has been evaluated through the use of DW-NOMINATE 
scores,99 which is a measure of liberalism-conservatism. The scores100 are determined on the basis 
of aggregated roll-call voting data, and are commonly used in social science and political science 
research. While DW-NOMINATE scores are effective in analyzing other elements of 
redistricting and Congress (polarization, party, policy outcomes, etc.), they are likely not the best 
available measure of minority substantive representation. DW-NOMINATE scores neglect the 
unique political interests of minority voters, as they are tailored in no particular way to minority 
interests or issues pertinent to civil rights. For the purposes of analysis, however, these scores are 																																																								
99 Lublin; The Paradox of Representation; Grose, Congress in Black and White. 
100 Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, “D-Nominate after 10 Years: A Comparative Update to Congress: A 
Political-Economic History of Roll-Call Voting.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 26, no. 1 (2001) 5–29. 
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advantageous in many ways due primarily to the comparability across time and the range and 
variability of scores.  
 As many studies101 have done before, this study incorporates LCCR scores as the primary 
outcome variable of analysis in the evaluation of substantive representation. LCCR scores are 
based on voting records compiled by the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR), and 
assess roll-call voting on legislation pertinent to civil rights issues. LCCR scores are based upon 
the rate of support for bills pertinent to civil rights issues when they reach the floor for a vote. 
The number of bills used to calculate the score varies by congressional session, but is typically 
between 10-20 votes. The scores are calculated on the basis of voting behavior on select bills 
determined by the Leadership Conference to be a top priority. While this score may fall short of 
completely capturing substantive representation, it better demonstrate the behavior of 
representatives in relation to the relevant preferences and legislative voting on minority interests 
than either DW-NOMINATE or ADA scores.  
 ADA scores, developed by Americans for Democratic Action102 are similar to DW-
NOMINATE scores in that they are measures of political liberalism. However, they are slightly 
different because the scoring is limited to key votes on social and economic issues, domestic and 
abroad. Like DW-NOMINATE scores, ADA scores are not tailored in any particular fashion to 
issues pertinent to civil rights. The score provides a Liberal Quotient (LQ), which is based on the 
20 most important issues in a given session. The total possible score is a 100, as each vote is 
																																																								
101 Cameron et al., “Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress”; 
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worth 5 points.103 These scores offer valuable insights into representation and Congress, but are 
limited in their applicability to minority substantive representation.  
Hypotheses: 
 I arrived at my hypotheses upon evaluating much of the relevant literature and examining 
the conclusions of other scholars. My personal understandings and experiences with the 
legislative redistricting process also influenced these hypotheses. As much of the research 
investigates the necessary means for increasing minority descriptive representation, it seemed 
increasingly important to take the analysis in this project a step further and to evaluate the extent 
to which the increases in descriptive representation influences changes in substantive 
representation within surrounding districts. As partisan influences infuse the redistricting process 
and partisan gerrymandering intensifies in unprecedented ways, the opportunity to consider the 
ways in which minority representation may be subject to such partisan factors was the burning 
theoretical question at the base of this research. As much of the recent literature on redistricting 
has considered partisan gerrymandering and the Republican legislative control of the districting 
process in more states now than during much of the previous research, I endeavored to provide 
an evaluation of how the restricting method has affected minority representation.  
 The hypotheses consider descriptive representation and substantive representation 
uniquely. As it relates to descriptive representation, I hypothesize that district maps drawn by 
Democratic legislatures, commissions, and the judiciary will construct the greatest number of 
majority-minority districts, thus providing the greatest number of minority representatives. Not 
only do these bodies have an expressed interest – especially the Judiciary and Democratic 
legislatures – in enhancing minority representation, but also they were also responsible for the 																																																								
103 Americans for Democratic Action. “ADA Voting Records,” accessed January 10, 2018, https://adaction.org/ada-
voting-records/ 
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redistricting process in Southern states, during the majority of my study. Again, these states 
contain the highest minority populations in the country. There is a need to address how well 
different methods responded to Shaw and other mandates, but it is also important to best 
illustrate how methods vary in their approaches to providing opportunities for minority 
representation looking ahead to future redistricting cycles.  
 To study this, redistricting methods were analyzed relative to their generated proportion 
minority-influence districts, and districts that elected minority representatives. This approach is 
utilized due to the conclusions drawn from previous scholarly research, which illustrated the 
extremely high electoral success rates (~95%) of minority candidates in majority-minority 
districts104 and, to a lesser degree, minority-influence districts. It is important to understand, on 
an empirical level, how redistricting can benefit or constrain minority representation. Due to the 
newfangled, widespread Republican control of the majority of the Southern state legislatures, it 
is vital to evaluate the ways in which these legislatures have systematically constructed districts 
geared toward providing minorities with representation.  
 As for substantive representation, I expect districts drawn by commissions and the 
judiciary to concentrate minority voters into districts at high enough levels as to provide minority 
voters with descriptive representation, but not to such extreme levels that minority influence and 
LCCR scores in neighboring districts are sacrificed. I believe that such a result is likely because 
of the interests of commissions and the judiciary in providing not only descriptive representation, 
but also spreading minority influence across surrounding districts, as to more fully participate in 
the political process. Conversely, I believe that districts drawn by partisan legislatures will be 
																																																								
104 Lublin; The Paradox of Representation, 41 (Between 1972 and 1994, Blacks won 200 of the 209 races in which 
Blacks constituted a majority in the district). 
	 	 		
	28	
catered more towards purely creating minority districts, rather than establishing well-dispersed 
minority influence.  
 Partisan bodies and the maps they produce, I believe, endeavor to facilitate increased 
levels of descriptive representation as to comply with the Voting Rights Act and to appease key 
constituency groups. Such efforts are unlikely to extend to the substantive representation of these 
groups, as the laws don’t require it and the partisan gains may be diminished. I expect that 
Republican legislatures, which have tended to receive less support from minority voters to create 
districts favorable to minority voters only to the extent required by law. Insofar as the law is 
concerned, the mandates and requirements that have historically guided states to provide districts 
with reasonable prospects of electing minority representatives have neglected the importance of 
influence in surrounding districts, focusing, I stipulate, too narrowly on the creation of minority 
districts. This is certainly a pitfall of the VRA, but has become even more of an issue since the 
ruling of Shelby County v. Holder in 2013.  
 When minority voters are over-concentrated – above the threshold – the influence in the 
surrounding districts will likely tend to be subsequently diluted, which I believe will result in 
lower levels of support for issues pertinent to minority interests. I anticipate this over-
concentration to be more common among district plans drawn by partisan legislatures. 
Commissions and districts drawn by the judiciary are likely, I believe, to put aside the competing 
interests of partisan and racial representation, which subsequently allows for the maximization of 
minority influence across districts, and more active, general political participation as well.   
 Due to the geographical variance of political and racial attitudes, I expect the threshold of 
concentration needed to optimize minority substantive representation to be lower in the North 
than in the Southern states covered by the VRA. On average, I believe that as the minority 
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population in a district increases the LCCR scores in the surrounding districts will decrease more 
significantly when considering states covered by the VRA. This will likely be seen in cases most 
consistently when minority populations in singular districts exceed 60 percent. Analyzing these 
thresholds from a regional standpoint will provide valuable insights into the representation at 
differing levels of concentration.  
 As the legislation and mandates concerning minority representation focus primarily on 
the number of minority representatives, there is a need to look at substantive representation 
specifically. Evaluating surrounding districts in relation to the composition of minority districts 
will likely to explain whether tradeoffs between the two types of representation exist. If they do, 
such an illustration will help in defining the thresholds at which these tradeoffs may be most 
likely to exist, and to what extent they may impact substantive representation. 
 
Data Collection: 
 Congressional district data was compiled for sixteen individual Congresses from the 98th-
113th (1982-2012). The large sample allows for a comprehensive study, which includes historic, 
legal and partisan changes all embedded within the history of the numbers. This analysis only 
includes district evaluations for states that have more than one congressional district.  
 The variables included in the dataset are district specific entries related to the personal 
characteristics of individual representatives, ideological information, characteristics of the 
respective congresses, demographics data, longitudinal-latitudinal district specifications, and 
lagged data, spatial data. The lagged variables are particularly unique to this study of minority 
representation – this data was coded to aggregate averages of data in surrounding, neighboring 
districts. The sources consulted to compile the dataset include: Census Bureau, Congressional 
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Quarterly, The Congressional Quarterly Press, The National Historical Geographic Information 
System, govtrack.us, Cook’s Partisan Score database, voteview.com, Leadership Conference on 
Civil Rights, Congressional Shapefiles archives and National Conference of State Legislatures: 
50 State Profiles.  
 I utilized Nicholas Seabrook’s data presented in Drawing the Lines (2017) regarding the 
control of the redistricting process, to code for the individual methods as partisan, bipartisan, 
independent or judicial. The control of the redistricting process was determined through the 
recognition of the party control of the state legislature, and statutory or judicial consequences 
when they occurred. As Seabrook’s data concerned only the 1992 and 2002 cycles of 
redistricting, I compiled the additional data pertaining to the 1982 and 2012 cycles from The 
Congressional Quarterly’s Almanac of American Politics, The National Conference of State 
Legislatures: 50 State Profiles, and from John Levitt’s resource on Congressional redistricting 
methods. In coding the 1982 and 2012 redistricting methods, I maintained the criteria established 
by Seabrook in coding the control of the redistricting process, using a specific set of guidelines 
that will be made explicitly clear.  
 To evaluate the effect the percentage of minority voters in a given district has on LCCR 
scores in the surrounding districts, I coded lagged variables for surrounding districts. To do this, 
I used cartographic shapefiles of congressional district boundaries, which utilize latitude-
longitude, county districts, and legal resources to determine the location of district lines. To 
determine which districts were surrounding districts, the shapefiles were used to locate districts 
that shared a boundary with a given district, in a given state. The lagged data was then coded for 
each district. Accordingly, these spatial lags help to interpret the effect of a change in the 
neighboring districts’ average values, holding other variables constant. 
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 To better localize the impact of the minority concentration in districts on the surrounding 
LCCR scores, I also coded into the dataset if the state’s plans were drawn under the preclearance 
requirement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. States were coded differently on the basis of 
whether or not they were fully or partially covered by the Voting Rights Act. These are binary 
variables, which are used to differentiate the units of analysis in the various models.  
 
Variables of Analysis and Operationalization:  
Independent Variables:  
 The methods used to draw districts lines were divided into five categories, which were 
coded as follows: Judiciary (1), Independent Commission (2), Democratic Controlled Legislature 
(3), Republican Controlled Legislature (4), Bipartisan Legislature (5). As such, each state was 
assigned as (1-5) for each Congressional election (98th – 113th Congresses). These variables were 
coded numerically and categorically for the purposes of different quantitative analysis. The 
following three segments contain explanations as to the specific methodology used to determine 
and code the “method” of redistricting.  
 
Judiciary and Independent Commission 
 A state was recorded as (1) if the districting plan was substantially modified or struck 
down in court. In considering this, I maintained Seabrook’s definition of “substantial 
modification.” District maps that were sent to court, yet upheld by the judiciary, were coded as 
(2-5). If the state delegated the responsibility of drawing the district maps to an independent 
commission, the state was coded as such and assigned a (2). Regardless of the form of the 
commission they were all coded uniformly, as is commonplace in similar research for the 
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purposes of analysis. Commissions are often bestowed with the responsibly of drawing district 
lines by a State Constitution, which sometimes instructs the delegation of redistricting duty in the 
event that the district plan fails to pass through the legislature by a statutory deadline.  
 
Partisan Controlled Legislature 
 Partisan control either Democrat (3) or Republican (4) was coded for states if a number 
of conditions were met. If one party controlled all three chambers of the state government, then 
the state was assigned either (3) or (4). However, if a party controlled both houses of the state 
legislature (for example: House and Senate), but not the governorship the state was assigned a 
(3) or (4) if gubernatorial approval was not needed for the passage of the districting plan. For 
example, if the legislature and Senate are able to override the gubernatorial veto or, as in a 
handful of states, the governor’s approval is not necessary or the governor does not have veto 
power over the plans, then the state’s district plan was passed under either a Democratic 
Controlled Legislature (3) or a Republican Controlled Legislature (4). 
  
Bipartisan Controlled Legislature 
 States were coded as Bipartisan Controlled Legislature (5) if a single political party 
controlled both houses of the state’s legislature, but not control the governorship. This is also the 
case if there is a bipartisan agreement and both legislative bodies approved the plan and signed 
into law by the governor, or if one party controlled the state house while the other party 
controlled the state senate and the governor signed the bill into law.  
 
Population Statistics and Thresholds of Concentration 
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 The Black, Hispanic, and non-white district population were also used as independent 
variables in my analysis. To evaluate the effect of the thresholds of minority concentration, I 
established five thresholds for the concentration of these population percentages respectively. To 
establish these thresholds, I simply used the respective population percentages. The thresholds 
that I established were population concentrations between: 0-20%, 20-40%, 40-50%, 50-60%, 
and 60%+. I decided upon these thresholds for a number of reasons, but the leading motivation 
was the consideration of the different thresholds presented in previous literature. I incorporated 
the spatial lags for this data as well, in that all of the lagged population percentages were coded 
from the shapefiles, as well as the thresholds.  
 
Dependent Variables 
 In an effort to test my first hypothesis, I used majority-minority districts (MMDS), 
minority-influence districts (MIF), and the race of representatives as dependent variables. These 
variables were coded as binary. If the White population of a district was less than 50 percent, 
MMDS was coded as 1. Similarly, if the White population of a district was less than 60 percent, 
the MIF was coded as 1 – in these cases, districts were coded as both a MMDS and a MIF. If the 
representative in the district was either Black or Hispanic, the race of the representative in the 
district was coded as 1. While many scholars suggest that minority voters concentrated at lower 
levels (between 15-40) should constitute what others also refer to as minority-influence districts, 
I decided to code this variable at the 40 percent threshold.  
 For my second hypothesis, substantive representation was primarily evaluated on the 
basis of scores created by the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR). The LCCR scores 
were compiled by the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and assigned to each member of 
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Congress in a given congressional cycle. The variable I created from these scores coded a 
representative with a LCCR score of 100 a LCCR of 1, a representative with a score of 50 a 
LCCR of .5, a score of 10 a LCCR of .1, and so on. An LCCR score of 100 indicates that the 
legislator voted consistently with the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights – on all votes in a 
given congressional session. Notably, the LCCR scores are not comparable across Congresses 
because the numbers of votes that the scores were calculated from change over time, as do the 
particular bills that were considered on the floor. In some of the analyses the LCCR scores were 
lagged with the utilization of the shapefiles.    
 
Control Variables 
 Due to the significant correlation between LCCR scores, and both party affiliation and 
the race of legislators, I included both race and party as control variables in the models. As noted 
in previous research, Democrats do tend to vote relatively consistently with the LCCR agenda, as 
do minority representatives. 105  I have additionally controlled for the party affiliation of 
representatives in surrounding districts in an effort to better illustrate the effect of minority 
concentration on the LCCR score in surrounding districts, which, in this case, is significantly 
different in surrounding districts controlled by Republicans in comparison to Democrats.  
 
Methodology Selection  
 To test and convey the results of the discussed hypotheses, a number of different 
statistical tests and graphical displays were used. To demonstrate the effect of redistricting 
methods on the creation of majority-minority districts and districts that elected minority 
representatives, two plots were created with noise adjustments as to illustrate the frequency of 																																																								
105 McClain, “Can We All Get Along?“ Racial and Ethnic Minorities in American Politics. 
	 	 		
	35	
the values without over-plotting. To create these, I ran a “ggplot” in the software R. This 
software was used to develop not only the plots, but was also used in the development of the 
regression models and for exploratory data analysis.  
 To evaluate the statistical significance of the visual representations, I utilized a Chi-
Squared test to determine the significance of the creation of majority-minority districts and 
districts that elected minority representatives. The creation of these districts was tested in 
relationship to the method used to draw the districts. Such was done in an effort to explore 
whether some methods, relative to others, created these districts at a greater rate. Using 
comparability measures, I was able to test the likelihood that the observed creation of these 
districts was due to chance, or if their creation was dependent upon external factors similar to the 
ones that have been discussed.  
 I then used an ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression to test the results of both the 
creation of majority-minority districts and districts that elected minority representatives. OLS 
was used in an effort to predict the relationship between the creation of these districts and the 
methods used to draw the districts. This regression is also effective in identifying the strength of 
this relationship, which allows for a fuller more predictive understanding of the results. As to 
help with predicting the creation of these types of districts, OLS can also be used as an effective 
way to test the strength of the relationship, and to make relative comparisons of those strengths. 
In this model, Bipartisan drawn maps were omitted and were used as the intercept. Therefore, the 
predicted values for the methods present in the model are to be understood as relative to the 
Bipartisan drawn maps. 
 To test for substantive representation, I again relied on an OLS model. In this case, OLS 
was advantageous because of the stipulation of a linear relationship between LCCR scores and 
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surrounding district concentrations. To support the hypothesis that the concentration of minority 
voters in select districts affects the legislative support of civil rights issues by the representative 
in the surrounding districts, it is necessary to establish that a relationship between the two exists. 
The OLS model does just this, as it ascertains the relationship between district concentrations 
and LCCR scores – the model is also capable of identifying the strength of this relationship. This 
is necessary in the pursuit of establishing a threshold at which predicted LCCR scores are 
affected the most by minority concentrations.  
 In the final model, which examines the effect of the redistricting method on subsequent 
substantive representation, the methods used to create minority districts with descriptive 
representation was analyzed in relation to the surrounding LCCR scores. And OLS regression 
was used for this analysis, as to predict the relationship between the method of districting and 
substantive representation.  
 There are limitations of the OLS models used to test for minority representation. 
Ordinary least squares may be biased in some ways, but as a descriptive model testing for 
predicted relational values the model does well. Ultimately the OLS tends to reduce variance and 
additionally holds up well in the presence of new data. Due to the limitations of the OLS, it 
would not be possible to model the data pertaining to surrounding district concentrations in the 
same regression as the district concentrations – further exploration and modeling would need to 
be done to evaluate the two concentrations alongside one another.   
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Results and Findings 
 The models demonstrated support for my hypotheses regarding both descriptive and 
substantive representation. On the whole, clear differences can be seen between the Partisan 
drawn maps. That is, Democratic plans tend to provide a greater proportion of districts 
compatible with descriptive representation while still suitable for substantive representative, 
whereas the Republican drawn plans tend to produce fewer opportunities for descriptive 
representation and also sacrifice substantive representation in surrounding districts. District maps 
drawn by the Judiciary, similar to those drawn by Democratic legislatures, provide for relatively 
high levels of descriptive representation and allow for substantive representation in surrounding 
districts.   
 Districts drawn by Bipartisan legislatures did not appear to significantly provide for 
either descriptive or substantive representation, although the number of districts such legislatures 
were responsible for was only substantial during one of the four redistricting cycles observed in 
the study. Districts drawn by Commissions were not suggestive of the hypothesized support and 
creation of minority influence – such is likely the case due to the few number of districts drawn 
by Commissions, with a particular absence of districting responsibility in states with high 
minority populations.  
 As will be discussed and presented, higher thresholds of minority concentration in 
surrounding districts were predictive of lower LCCR scores. This is particularly the case in 
surrounding districts with non-White and Black concentrations in the 40-50% and 50-60% 
thresholds. From the evaluation of surrounding district concentration, it is additionally predicted 
that the region of analysis is important – in states covered by the VRA, the concentration of 
minority voters in surrounding districts tended to decrease the LCCR scores at lower thresholds 
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than in the other regions. The Hispanic concentrations were not as significant as thought to be, 
which, as will be explained, the voting cohesion among Hispanic voters may have influenced 
some of these results.  
 
Changes in Method Over Time 
 As the results regarding descriptive representation contribute meaningfully to those 
regarding substantive representation, the findings will be presented in that order. However, 
before extrapolating on those findings, it is important to illustrate the changes in redistricting 
methods that occurred between the 98th and 113th Congresses, which included four ten-year 
periods during which control of the districting process often changes, depending upon state. A 
graphic illustrating these changes can be seen in Figure I. 
 The most significant observation demonstrated in Figure 1 is the change of partisan 
control, over the four cycles, from districts drawn by Democratic legislatures to Republican 
legislatures. The number of districts drawn by Democrats decreased significantly in the 103rd 
Congress (1992 redistricting cycle), a decrease that continued until the most recent sample year. 
In place of Democratic legislative control were not Republican drawn maps, but rather Judiciary- 
drawn maps. Due to the legal disputes following the 1992 redistricting cycle, the judiciary 
assumed the responsibility for drawing the maps in many states due to failures to comply with 
federal laws. However, in the following redistricting cycle in 2002 (108th Congress), Republican 
legislatures gained control of the redistricting process in many states and have continued to 
accumulate more control since then.   
 Notably, there was a short period of bipartisan legislative control during the transition 
between Democratic legislatures to Republican, which lasted only until the 108th Congress. In 
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the 2002 redistricting cycle (108th Congress), the number of districts drawn by independent 
commissions increased as well. Figure I demonstrates these changes in greater breadth.  
 
Figure I: Changes in Control of Redistricting Process 
 
 
Results for Descriptive Representation  
 The first hypothesis, stipulated that the method used to draw districts would affect the 
number and rate of districts that elected minority representatives was supported upon evaluation. 
To measure descriptive representation, I evaluated the creation of majority-minority districts 
(MMDS), minority-influence districts (MIF), and districts that were successful in electing 
minority representatives (MR). To do this, I assessed the redistricting methods relative to the 
creation of the types of districts mentioned above: MMDS, MIF and MR. First, I considered the 
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total number of districts drawn by the different methods during each Congress and then 
calculated the weighted proportion of (MMDS, MIF, MR) 106 that were drawn by the respective 
methods. 
 For example, in the 98th Congress, Bipartisan legislatures drew a total of 77 districts. Of 
those 77, seven were MMDS, six were MIF, and six MR. The	weighted	 proportion	 of	 the	districts	drawn	by	bipartisan	legislatures	were	as	follows:	(9.1%),	(7.8%),	and	(7.8%)	for	MMDS,	MIF,	and	MR	respectively.		A graphical display of these findings can be found below in 
Figure II. 
Figure	II:	Proportion	of	MMDS	Drawn	by	Each	Method 
 
 
																																																								
106 The weighted proportion was calculated as the number of (ex. MMDS/total number of districts drawn by that 
method). Calculations were made for both individual years and for the whole sample, per method. 
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 From Figure II one can see that the proportion of MMDS created by Republican 
legislatures did not increase relative to the number of districts that Republican legislatures drew 
from the 108th – 113th Congresses. In fact, even as the Republican Party assumed control of the 
redistricting process in additional states, the weighted proportion of MMDS that those 
Republican state legislatures drew went down. The number of districts drawn by Republican 
legislatures during the 2002 redistricting cycle (108th) was 96. Of those 96, a total of 13 MMDS 
were created (a 13.5% weighted proportion). In the 2012 redistricting cycle (113th Congress), 
after taking control of the directing process in 52 more districts, Republican legislatures drew a 
total of 19 MMDS (a 12.8% weighted proportion).  
 Districts drawn by Commissions and the Judiciary increased significantly during this 
same period, from 108th – 113th Congresses. In the 112th Congress, Commissions drew a 
weighted proportion of 15.9%, whereas the Judiciary drew a weighted proportion of MMDS of 
27.4%. In the 113th Congress, Commissions drew 46.4% and the Judiciary drew 30.6%. While 
the later districts drawn by Commissions show increased efforts to create MMDS, the overall 
weighted proportion was lower than that of Democratic legislatures and the Judiciary, at 14.6%. 
Districts drawn by Democratic legislatures had the highest weighted proportions over the whole 
sample (98-113th Congresses), with a weighted proportion of 22.3% of the total districts drawn as 
MMDS.  
 These results help to demonstrate one element of my first hypothesis – being Democratic 
Legislatures, the Judiciary and Commissions will provide for the highest number of minority 
electability districts. Table 1 below highlights the significance of the relationship between the 
creation of MMDS and the redistricting method. The highest proportion of MMDS were drawn 
by Democratic legislatures and by the Judiciary, at highly significant levels, as demonstrated by 
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the Pr > ChiSq column. This column provides the likelihood ratio of the goodness of fit. The 
contrast results in the second half of the table suggest that the biggest difference between 
methods in the creation of MMDS was between Democratic legislatures and Judicial drawn 
districts relative to all other types. In Table 1, the comparisons between districting methods with 
higher Chi-Square values suggest the greatest difference between methods in creating MMDS.  
 
Table I: Chi-Squared Test for Proportion of MMDS 
Types 
Mean 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error Chi-Square 
    
Pr > ChiSq 
BIP vs. DEM 0.2247 0.5974 4.30 0.0382 
BIP vs. IND 0.3820 0.6678 0.52 0.4714 
BIP vs. JUD 0.2284 0.5907 4.25 0.0393 
BIP vs. REP 0.4478 0.6686 0.10 0.7539 
DEM vs. IND 0.6807 0.3612 4.40 0.0360 
DEM vs. REP 0.7366 0.3627 8.04 0.0046 
IND vs. JUD 0.3238 0.3500 4.42 0.0354 
IND vs. REP 0.5674 0.4697 0.33 0.5634 
JUD vs. REP 0.7325 0.3516 8.21 0.0042 
 
 
Contrast Results 
Contrast DF Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq Type 
DEM vs. Others Except JUD 3 13.65 0.0034 Wald 
JUD vs. Others Except DEM 3 14.71 0.0021 Wald 
 
 While Figure II and Table I show the weighted proportion at which MMDS were drawn, 
by the respective methods, such information only explains one element pertinent to our sphere of 
research. That is: Which method renders the highest levels of descriptive representation? While 
the creation of MMDS is believed to translate into the election of minority representatives, such 
is not always the observed result. As Figure III suggests, the creation of MMDS is highly 
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associated with the creation of districts that elect minority representatives. Higher weighted 
proportions of the proportion of minority representatives elected from the districts drawn by each 
method do tend to be related to the frequency at which MMDS are created. However, the extent 
to which this can be said differs relative to the method used to draw the districts.  
 
Figure III: Proportion of Minority Representatives Elected from Districts Drawn by Each 
Method   
 
 
 
 The effectiveness of districts drawn by the Judiciary and Democratic legislatures in 
electing minority representatives are the highest among the five methods, with 13.1 percent and 
12.9 percent total weighted proportions, respectively. The proportion of districts drawn by 
Republican legislatures that were successful in electing minority representatives was the lowest 
observed, with a weighted proportion of 9.3% of the districts electing minority representatives. 
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While this is low in many regards, the number of Republican districts that elected minority 
representatives was just 1.6 percent lower than the number of the proportion of majority-minority 
districts that Republicans created107. The weighted proportion of Democratic legislative districts 
that drew MR relative to MMDS dropped by 9.4%, whereas the Judicial drawn districts dropped 
by 6.9%.  
 Table II exhibits these results in a similar fashion to the Chi-Squared test used in Table 
I. However, the results show that the relationship between districting method and the ultimate 
election of minority representatives is significantly weaker than the relationship between the 
creation of MMDS and method. Nonetheless, the Chi-Squared test suggest that districts drawn 
by Democratic legislatures and by the Judiciary tend to result in a greater number of minority 
elected officials than other districting methods. This suggests a number of things about minority 
descriptive representation. It is often used as a political, partisan tool, which Democrats seek to 
maximize in efforts to appeal to minority constituencies. It is also one of the primary reasons that 
the Judiciary assumes the responsibility of drawing district maps in the first place – in 
circumstances when the responsible party has failed to provide for proper representation.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
107 The proportion of majority-minority districts created Republican legislatures between the 98-113th Congresses 
was 10.9 percent, whereas the number of minority representatives elected from districts created by 
Republican legislatures during the same time was 9.3 percent.  
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Table II: Chi-Squared Test for Proportion of Minority Representatives Elected 
Label 
Mean 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
BIP vs. DEM 0.3101 0.6070 1.74 0.1877 
BIP vs. IND 0.3725 0.6629 0.62 0.4313 
BIP vs. JUD 0.3124 0.5991 1.73 0.1880 
BIP vs. REP 0.4215 0.6722 0.22 0.6375 
DEM vs. IND 0.5691 0.3583 0.60 0.4377 
DEM vs. JUD 0.5028 0.2190 0.00 0.9599 
DEM vs. REP 0.6185 0.3752 1.66 0.1980 
IND vs. JUD 0.4336 0.3448 0.60 0.4385 
IND vs. REP 0.5511 0.4602 0.20 0.6561 
JUD vs. REP 0.6159 0.3624 1.70 0.1927 
 
 
Contrast Results 
Contrast DF Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq Type 
DEM vs. Others Except JUD 3 3.16 0.3670 Wald 
JUD vs. Others Except DEM 3 3.39 0.3358 Wald 
 
 
 Table III shows an OLS regression of the creation of MMDS and districts from which 
Black and Hispanic representatives have been elected, relative to the method. This considers the 
creation of these districts in the country as a whole, and additionally displays the results solely 
for states covered by the VRA. The observed values in Table III suggest that districts drawn by 
Democratic legislatures and by the Judiciary produced a greater proportion of MMDS and 
districts that elected minority representatives than the other methods. Districts drawn by 
Commissions and Republican legislatures tended to create fewer majority-minority districts and 
districts from which minority candidates were elected. 
 While these predicted values are consistent across columns 1-4, the predicted values in 
columns three and four (districts drawn in states covered by the VRA) suggest that the 
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Democratic legislatures and the Judiciary tend to predict MMDS, whereas the others predict a 
negative relationship. These results are consistent with those provided in Figure II and Table I, 
but the regional consideration offered by columns three and four allow for further inference that 
such results may be more consistently present in districts covered by the VRA. Columns three 
and four similarly help to illustrate the effectiveness of MMDS in electing minority 
representatives, as the predicted values for Democratic Legislatures and the Judiciary are the 
only method with significant, positive values in the model.  
 The descriptive representation of minorities increased over time and has done so 
similarly to the increase in the number of majority-minority districts. In the 98th Congress, there 
were 46 majority-minority and 30 Black and Hispanic representatives. In the 113th Congress 
there were 115 majority-minority districts and a total of 72 Black and Hispanic representatives. 
On a very basic level this shows the effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act amendments in 1982, 
which encouraged states to draw these districts. It also shows the effectiveness of the 
redistricting process in providing districts able to afford greater levels of minority representation. 
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Table III: Predicted Values for MMDS and Minority Representatives Elected in 
Whole County and in States Covered by VRA 
 
 
                        
               Dependent variable: MMDS and Minority Representative 
 
 
 
 
MMDS in whole 
country  
Minority 
Representative in 
whole country 
MMDS in VRA 
States 
Minority 
Representative in VRA 
States 
 Democratic Legislature 0.102*** 0.028** 0.103*** 0.056* 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.032) (0.029) 
     Independent Commission -0.016 -0.007 -0.098** -0.049 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.040) (0.036) 
     Judicial Drawn 0.083*** 0.030*** 0.091*** 0.070** 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.030) (0.028) 
     Republican Legislature -0.062*** -0.036** -0.098*** -0.049 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.035) (0.032) 
     99th Congress -0.017 0.002 0.004 -0.033 
 (0.026) (0.022) (0.055) (0.050) 
     103rd Congress 0.079*** 0.057** 0.068 0.045 
 (0.026) (0.022) (0.060) (0.055) 
     108th Congress 0.149*** 0.085*** 0.161*** 0.112** 
 (0.026) (0.023) (0.059) (0.054) 
     113th Congress 0.205*** 0.116*** 0.279*** 0.138** 
 (0.026) (0.023) (0.060) (0.054) 
     Constant 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.041 0.052 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.044) (0.040) 
      Observations 6,820 6,820 1,153 1,153 
R2 0.048 0.015 0.099 0.051 
Adjusted R2 0.046 0.012 0.084 0.035 
Residual Std. Error 0.373 (df = 6800) 0.327 (df = 6800) 0.357 (df = 1133) 0.324 (df = 1133) 
F Statistic 18.167
*** (df = 19; 
6800) 
5.421*** (df = 19; 
6800) 
6.562*** (df = 19; 
1133) 3.182
*** (df = 19; 1133) 
 
Note: Dependent variable 
is consistent with heading 
of columns; Robust 
standard errors in 
parenthesis.  
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Results for Substantive Representation 
 While creating districts with high concentrations of minority voters tends to increases the 
likelihood of electability of minority representatives, it is important to evaluate the degree to 
which those concentration may effect the support of Civil Rights legislation in surrounding 
districts. Hence, LCCR scores and minority concentrations are evaluated, in both districts that 
elect minorities and surrounding districts, in an effort to analyze the effect of various thresholds 
of concentration and predicted LCCR scores.  
 In order to examine the effect of surrounding population concentrations on the LCCR 
scores, three different concentration variables were used. The first examines the effect of 
surrounding non-White, minority concentrations on the LCCR scores. The second and third 
evaluate Black and Hispanic concentration.  
 Upon running OLS regressions with LCCR score as the outcome variable, predicted 
LCCR scores tend to decrease alongside higher concentrations non-White voters in surrounding 
districts. The results from this OLS regression can be found below in Table IV. The predicted 
LCCR scores decrease as non-White concentrations in surrounding districts increase – this is 
relative to the surrounding concentration level of 0-20% non-White and with all else held 
constant. The predicted decreases in the LCCR scores had the greatest decreases in the 50-60% 
threshold. In regard to the 60% + threshold, the predicted LCCR score had less of a decrease 
than the others when compared to the 0-20% threshold. 
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Table IV: Predicted LCCR Scores for Non-White Concentrations 
 
      Dependent variable: LCCR Score 
 
 Whole Country 
Preclearance for covered 
states and jurisdictions 
Preclearance for 
only covered states 
 LCCR Score in surrounding district 0.567*** 0.636*** 0.563*** 
 (0.016) (0.022) (0.036) 
    Surrounding minority concentration 20-40% -0.032*** -0.060*** -0.031*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.011) 
    Surrounding minority concentration 40-50% -0.047*** -0.060*** -0.059*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.020) 
    Surrounding minority concentration 50-60% -0.051*** -0.071*** -0.050** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.023) 
    Surrounding minority concentration >60% -0.029** -0.061*** -0.049 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.030) 
    Republican Rep. -0.653*** -0.665*** -0.653*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) 
Republican Rep. in surrounding district 0.307*** 0.372*** -0.044 
 (0.103) (0.134) (0.275) 
    Democratic Rep. in surrounding district -0.002 0.019 -0.374 
 (0.103) (0.135) (0.276) 
        Minority 0.366 0.393 0.057** 
 (0.254) (0.262) (0.028) 
    Minority rep. surrounded by Republican -0.189 -0.178 0.127*** 
 (0.255) (0.262) (0.046) 
    Minority rep. surrounded by Democrat -0.318 -0.350  
 (0.255) (0.263)  
    Constant 0.415*** 0.358*** 0.780*** 
 (0.103) (0.134) (0.275) 
     Observations 6,466 3,070 1,093 
R2 0.845 0.863 0.838 
Adjusted R2 0.845 0.863 0.836 
Residual Std. Error 0.153 (df = 6452) 0.148 (df = 3056) 0.157 (df = 1081) 
F Statistic 2,714.650
*** (df = 13; 
6452) 
1,486.544*** (df = 13; 
3056) 
508.055*** (df = 11; 
1081) 
 Note: Dependent variable is LCCR 
score. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.  
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Substantive Representation: Black 
 In relation to the concentration of Black voters, Table V similarly demonstrates results 
that are illustrative of the significance of the surrounding thresholds upon LCCR scores. In 
relation to the concentration of Black voters in surrounding districts, the predicted LCCR scores 
decrease continually as concentrations grow. For example, in regard to states fully or partially 
covered by the VRA, the predicted LCCR scores decrease by (-.033) at 20-40% threshold of 
concentration, (-.061) at the 40-50% threshold, and by (-.156) at the 50-60% threshold. These 
predicted values are relative to the LCCR scores in the 0-20% threshold of concentration when 
all else is held constant. These results support the hypothesis that LCCR scores decrease in in 
relation to higher thresholds of surrounding Black concentrations, but it also suggests that there 
is a significant relationship between the scores as the concentrations increase. Surrounding 
district concentrations within the 50-60% threshold produce the greatest predicted decrease in 
LCCR scores in the whole country sample and the sample of states and jurisdictions covered by 
the VRA. 
 In only states covered fully by the VRA, the increase from 20-40% Black concentration 
to 40-50% concentration produce predicted LCCR scores of (-.025) and (-.100), respectively. 
Such values suggest that, especially in the core states covered by the VRA, the increase in Black 
population in surrounding districts from the lower threshold to the higher, the LCCR score is 
predicted to decrease four times more. Of course, this decrease is in relation to the values of the 
0-20% threshold when all else is held constant.   
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Table V: Predicted LCCR Scores for Black Concentrations 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: LCCR Score 
 
 Whole Country 
Preclearance for 
covered states and 
jurisdictions 
Preclearance for 
only covered 
states 
 LCCR score in surrounding district 0.570*** 0.655*** 0.578*** 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.035) 
    Surrounding Black concentration 20-40% -0.037*** -0.033*** -0.025** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) 
    Surrounding Black concentration 40-50% -0.092*** -0.061*** -0.100*** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.033) 
    Surrounding Black concentration 50-60% -0.139** -0.156**  
 (0.063) (0.067)  
    Republican Rep. in surrounding district 0.289*** 0.335** -0.011 
 (0.103) (0.135) (0.275) 
    Democratic Rep. in surrounding district -0.020 -0.037 -0.350 
 (0.103) (0.136) (0.276) 
    Republican Rep in district -0.654*** -0.666*** -0.654*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) 
    Minority Rep. 0.348 0.371 0.035 
 (0.254) (0.263) (0.027) 
    Minority rep. surrounded by Republican -0.183 -0.176 0.135*** 
 (0.255) (0.263) (0.045) 
    Minority rep. surrounded by Democrat -0.310 -0.342  
 (0.255) (0.264)  
    Constant 0.423*** 0.359*** 0.735*** 
 (0.103) (0.135) (0.275) 
     Observations 6,466 3,070 1,093 
R2 0.845 0.862 0.838 
Adjusted R2 0.845 0.862 0.836 
Residual Std. Error 0.153 (df = 6453) 0.149 (df = 3057) 0.157 (df = 1083) 
F Statistic 2,940.432
*** (df = 12; 
6453) 
1,593.236*** (df = 
12; 3057) 
620.337*** (df = 
9; 1083) 
 Note: OLS. Dependent variable is LCCR 
score 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 	
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Substantive: Hispanic 
 The OLS regression for the effect of Hispanic concentration thresholds on predicted 
LCCR scores produced slightly different and less illustrative results. The concentration of 
Hispanic voters into the various concentration thresholds produced fewer significant results. The 
relationship between surrounding Hispanic concentrations of 40-50% and LCCR scores, 
however, did generate significant results. In each observation except the third, states fully 
covered by the VRA, the 40-50% concentration threshold produced a predicted a decrease in 
LCCR score. This is the only threshold that had a predicted significant correlation with a change 
in LCCR score. Table VI shows the results for Hispanic concentration thresholds. There are a 
number of reasons that these results may have been less significant.  
 There are logical reasons behind the results in Table VI. Hispanic voters are not as 
heavily supportive of Democratic candidates as Black voters are, which is particularly the case 
for Cubans and El Salvadorians. It is possible that Floridian Cubans, for example, and other 
Hispanic voters not as closely tied to the Democratic Party are complicating what is being tested 
here. After all, there are more Hispanic representatives that are Republicans than there are Black 
Republicans. Due to the fact that Hispanic voters split their votes more consistently than Black 
voters, the election returns for Hispanic voters likely results in a less significant relationship 
between high Hispanic concentration and high LCCR scores. Nonetheless, of the observed 
predictions, 40-50% Hispanic concentration in surrounding districts tends to predict a decrease in 
LCCR score.   
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Table VI: Predicted LCCR Scores for Hispanic Concentrations 
 
 
Dependent variable: LCCR Score 
 
 Whole Country 
Preclearance for 
covered states and 
jurisdictions 
Preclearance for 
only covered states 
 LCCR score in surrounding district   0.588*** 0.681*** 0.584*** 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.035) 
    Surrounding Hispanic concentration 20-40% -0.003 0.009 -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.015) 
    Surrounding Hispanic concentration 20-40% -0.027** -0.025** -0.016 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.027) 
    Surrounding Hispanic concentration 20-40% -0.012 -0.014 -0.043 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.052) 
    Surrounding Hispanic concentration 20-40% -0.032 -0.034 -0.043 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.072) 
    Republican rep. in surrounding district 0.340*** 0.396*** 0.011 
 (0.103) (0.135) (0.276) 
    Democratic rep. in surrounding district 0.008 -0.005 -0.343 
 (0.104) (0.136) (0.277) 
    Republican rep -0.655*** -0.667*** -0.654*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) 
    Minority rep 0.343 0.348 0.038 
 (0.256) (0.265) (0.028) 
    Minority rep. surrounded by Republican -0.178 -0.149 0.132*** 
 (0.256) (0.265) (0.046) 
    Minority rep. surrounded by Democrat -0.305 -0.310  
 (0.257) (0.266)  
    Constant 0.368*** 0.288** 0.711** 
 (0.103) (0.135) (0.276) 
     Observations 6,466 3,070 1,093 
R2 0.844 0.861 0.836 
Adjusted R2 0.843 0.860 0.834 
Residual Std. Error 0.154 (df = 6452) 0.149 (df = 3056) 0.158 (df = 1081) 
F Statistic 2,676.135
*** (df = 13; 
6452) 
1,453.789*** (df = 13; 
3056) 
500.300*** (df = 11; 
1081) 
 Note: OLS. Dependent variable is 
LCCR score 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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LCCR Scores by Method 
 The effect of the redistricting method on subsequent substantive representation was 
examined on the basis of the creation of districts from which minority representatives were 
elected. Of these districts, the surrounding LCCR scores were modeled for each redistricting 
method. These results are shown in Table VII. The predicted LCCR scores in districts that 
surround those held by minority representatives tend to decrease when drawn by Republican 
legislatures. When drawn by the Judiciary and by Democratic legislatures, the predicted LCCR 
scores in the surrounding districts tend to increase. Interestingly, the predicted LCCR scores in 
surrounding districts, when drawn by Bipartisan legislative bodies, tend to increase most 
significantly when minority concentrations are above the 60% threshold. These predicted 
increases are to be understood relative to the 0-20% threshold and with all else held constant.  
 The data presented in Table VII, in conjunction with the previously addressed results 
regarding descriptive representation, suggest support for the hypothesis that districts drawn by 
Democratic legislatures and the Judiciary tend to provide descriptive representation with a lower 
level of sacrifice to substantive representation. For districts that elected minority representatives 
(successful descriptive representation) drawn by Democratic legislatures and the Judiciary, the 
predicted LCCR scores in the surrounding districts appear to be uniformly optimized at the 40-
50% level of concentration. According to the model, districts drawn by Republican legislatures 
that provide for increased descriptive representation tend to have predicted LCCR scores in 
surrounding districts that decrease significantly when concentrated at and above the 40-50% 
threshold.  
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Table VII: Predicted LCCR Scores by Method 
 
 Dependent variable: LCCR score in surrounding district  
   
 
 
Democratic 
Legislature 
Republican 
Legislature 
Bipartisan 
Legislature Judiciary Commission 
 Minority concentration 
between 20-40%  0.246 -0.328   -0.359 
 (0.218) (0.322)   (0.304) 
      Minority concentration 
between 40-50% 0.430
* -0.661** -0.185 0.385*** -0.325 
 (0.240) (0.330) (0.124) (0.129) (0.208) 
      Minority concentration 
between 50-60% 0.094 -0.658
** 0.189* 0.145* -0.161 
 (0.210) (0.311) (0.104) (0.086) (0.191) 
      Minority concentration 
over 60% 0.213 -0.122 0.455
*** 0.237*** -0.014 
 (0.211) (0.272) (0.091) (0.069) (0.195) 
      District LCCR score 0.302** 0.355 0.273 0.084 0.633* 
 (0.151) (0.418) (0.266) (0.170) (0.342) 
      Republican 
Representative 0.059 0.283  0.104 0.452 
 (0.134) (0.254)  (0.121) (0.306) 
      Constant 0.131 0.331 0.090 0.271 -0.011 
 (0.242) (0.497) (0.280) (0.166) (0.352) 
       Observations 210 82 150 268 84 
R2 0.119 0.240 0.398 0.060 0.255 
Adjusted R2 0.093 0.179 0.382 0.042 0.196 
Residual Std. Error 0.277 (df = 203) 0.270 (df = 75) 0.232 (df = 145) 0.267 (df = 262) 0.232 (df = 77) 
F Statistic 4.567
*** (df = 6; 
203) 
3.951*** (df = 6; 
75) 
24.000*** (df = 4; 
145) 
3.331*** (df = 5; 
262) 
4.382*** (df = 
6; 77) 
 Note: OLS: Dependent 
variable is LCCR in 
surrounding district 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Conclusion and Discussion: 
 Since the installment of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, significant progress has been 
made in efforts to afford minority groups more substantial levels of representation and influence. 
The number of minority representatives that occupy seats in Congress has increased more than 
twofold, and the Congressional Black Caucus and the Congressional Hispanic Caucus have 
gained significant traction. These achievements should be celebrated and revered genuine 
success stories. However, due to limitations of the electoral system, the influence of minority 
voters is often hampered in surrounding districts when select, heavily concentrated minority 
districts are created. Not only is minority influence diminished in surrounding districts, but the 
chances for Republicans electability in those districts increases due, at least in part, to the high 
concentration of minority voters in other districts. Such a result in surrounding districts seems to 
undermine many of the benefits gained from descriptive representation, when the full picture is 
considered.  
 This presents a difficult dilemma. Although the number of Black and Hispanic 
representatives in Congress has increased tremendously over the last 30 years, the average 
support of pertinent civil rights legislation in Congress has similarly decreased. While the 
increase in majority-minority districts is by no means the definitive reason for this decline in 
support of minority interests, such a phenomenon begs the question as to whether or not 
increased minority representation fulfills the objective of emboldening minority interests. This is 
the puzzle that this paper has attempted to explore – the potential tradeoff between descriptive 
representation and substantive representation. It is possible to provide for both descriptive and 
substantive representation through the careful construction of district plans, but this must be the 
objective of those responsible for constructing the maps. This meticulous design does not occur 
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often and is unlikely to occur absent a direct benefit to the party responsible for the districting 
process.  
 In accordance with the Voting Rights Act, the Supreme Court and the Department of 
Justice, state lawmakers, primarily since the 1992 redistricting cycle, have aspired to overtly 
create districts favorable to the electability of minority representatives. These efforts have been 
successful and they still are. However, the strategies employed to elect minority representatives 
are in need of critical reevaluation and reconsideration. As the Voting Rights Act intended firstly 
to provide equal access to political participation and opportunities to vote, the later amendments 
heightened the goals of the legislation by requiring state district maps to provide for the 
electability of minority representatives. The ways in which those districts are drawn necessitate 
careful monitoring as to ensure that minority voters are not being discriminated against, used as 
proxies for partisan gains, or purposefully split in efforts to dilute. The ability to monitor and 
enforce such discrimination, however, has been weakened since the Shelby decision in 2013.  
  In June of 2013, the Supreme Court struck down Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act. 
Shelby County v. Holder (2013) effectively relieved all 12 of the previously “covered” states and 
jurisdictions, mostly Southern, of their obligations to receive preclearance from the Department 
of Justice or Federal Court before changing election laws or procedures. Thus, during the next 
redistricting cycle (2022), states with egregious histories and even recent abuses of biased and 
prejudiced redistricting, will have the unrestricted opportunity to pass their district maps. Many 
well-informed, knowledgeable scholars maintain that discrimination and racial biases still 
influence state practices – predominantly in many of the 12 previously covered states. Justice 
Ginsburg, in her dissent to the Shelby opinion, said that “throwing out preclearance when it has 
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worked and is continuing to work to stop discriminatory changes is like throwing away your 
umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet.” 
 While the potential for discriminatory redistricting is a major concern, Shelby has already 
allowed for discriminatory changes to procedure, outside of the redistricting realm. North 
Carolina and Texas, two previously covered states, moved quickly to pass discriminatory voter-
ID laws and to change long standing voting procedures shortly after the Court released the 
decision. Such legislation jeopardizes the pursuit of equality that the Voting Right Act has for so 
long attempted to facilitate, and likely forecasts the practices that some states may resort to using 
during the 2022 redistricting cycle.  
 This is not to suggest that Republican lawmakers across the country are intending on 
drawing district maps that remove minority representatives from office. Neither is this a 
suggestion that they necessarily could do this. However, the reality remains that districts that 
provide for minority electability are vulnerable to the manipulation and degradation of minority 
influence. As illustrated by the findings of my research, the concentrations of minority voters in 
given districts have significant observed and predicted effects upon legislative support of civil 
rights issues in surrounding districts. The over-concentration of minority voters in a limited 
number of districts constrains the influence that those voters may have otherwise had in 
surrounding districts. My evaluation suggests that certain thresholds of influence may 
dramatically affect the degrees with which representatives in the surrounding districts support 
civil right legislation.   
 Congress must take explicit action to update the Voting Rights Act in an effort to ensure 
that minority voters are not discriminated against, taken advantage of and left vulnerable. 
Although issues of race tend to follow partisan lines, this is about much more than partisanship – 
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it is about the equal protection of all citizens. Effectively delivering on such an opportunity, to 
update and enhance the VRA, as six separate congresses have before, is a necessary safeguard to 
ensuring the security of one of the most fundamental elements of American democracy.  
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